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ABSTRACT
Although the Contingent Claims Analysis model has become the
premier theory of how value is allocated among claimants on firms,
its empirical validity remains an open question. In addition to being
of academic interest, a test of the model would have significant prac-
tical implications. If it can be established that the model predicts
actual market prices, then the model can be used to price new and un—
traded claims, to infer firm values from prices of traded claims like
equity and to price covenants separately. In this paperevidence is
presented on how well a model which makes the usual assumptionsin
the literature does in predicting market prices for claims in standard
capital structures. The results suggest that the usual assumptionlist
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A fundamental issue in the study of capital structure is how securities
issued by firms are valued in the financial markets. Typical corporate capital
structures contain many individual securities, which in themselves are complicated
by numerous covenants and indenture provisions. In addition, the valuation
of any individual security must consider complex interactions among different
claims. The corporate liability pricing model derived in Black and Scholes
(1973) and Merton (1974) represents a theoretical breakthrough on this problem,
with potentially significant practical applications. The critical insight of
their model is that every security is a contingent claim on the value of the
underlying firm. Hence these securities can be priced via an arbitrage logic
which is independent of the equilibrium structure of risk and return. Every
security must obey a general equation which depends only on riskiess interest
rates, the market value of the entire firm, and its volatility. The model
distinguishes among securities via boundary conditions which correspond to
covenants and indenture provisions. Since all of these data are directly ob-
servable or can be readily estimated, the model can be used to predict actual
market prices.
Although this model has been the premier theory of how value is
allocated among claimants on firms for almost a decade, its empirical validity
remains an open question. Ingersoll has tested the model's ability to predict
prices for dual purpose funds (1976) and to predict call policies for convertible
bonds (1977). But we know of no test of the model in its presumably most impor-
tant application, namely the valuation of debt and equity in typical corporate
capital structures. In addition to being of academic interest, such a test has
significant practical implications. If it can be established that the model
predicts actual market prices, then the model can be used to price new and2
untraded claims, to infer firm valuesfrom prices of traded claims likeequity
and to price covenantsseparately.
In this paper evidence is presentedon how well a model which
makes the usual assumptions in theliterature does in predicting marketprices
for claims in standard capitalstructures. The goal is to examine the
predictive power of this prototypical model. Theresults suggest that the
usual assumption list requires modificationbefore it can serve as a basis
for valuing corporate claims.
The usual assumptions made in thecontingent claims valuation
literature, e.g. Ingersoll (1976, 1977), areas follows:
(A.l) Perfect markets: The capital marketsare perfect with no
transactions costs, no taxes, and equal access to information
for all investors.
(A.2) Continuous trading.
(A.3) Ito dynamics: The value of the firm,V, satisfies the
stochastic differential equation.
dV =(cLV—C)dt+ aVdz
where total cash outflow per unit time C islocally certain
and ci2 are the instantaneous expected rate ofreturn and
variance of return on the underlying assets.
(A.4) Constant 2
(A.5)Nonstochastjc term structure: The instantaneous interest
rate r(t) is a known function of time.
(A.6) Shareholder wealth maximization:Management acts to maximize
shareholder wealth.
(A.7) Perfect bankruptcy protection: Firms cannot filefor pro-
tection from creditors except when they are unableto make
required cash payments. In this case perfect priority rules
govern the distribution of assets to claimants.
(A.8) Perfect antjdjlutjon protection: Nonew securities (other
than additional common equity shares) can be issueduntil
all existing non—equity claims are extinguished.Deals
between equity and subsets of other claimantsare prohibited.
(A.9) Perfect liquidity: Firms can sell assetsas necessary to
make cash payouts, with no loss in total value.3
Translating this set of assumptions into an explicit model for
valuing claims in a typical capital structure is considerably more difficult
than suggested by previous examples in the literature. A common capital
structure consists of equity and multiple issues of callable nonconvertible
sinking fund coupon debt. This differs from the standard example of a
single issue of nonconvertible debt, due to Merton (1974). because of both
the sinking fund and multiple issue features. One effect of sinking funds
is to reduce the effective maturity of debt. Another effect, due to the
option to retire at market or par (with or without an option to double the
sinking fund payment), is to make debt more like equity. Multiple issues
of debt introduce interactions among issues of debt, so that maximizing
the value of equity need not be equivalent to minimizing the value of a
given issue of debt, as in the single debt issue case. One accomplishment
of this paper is to translate the usual assumption list into a model for
realistic capital structures.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical
analysis of the valuation problem for a firm with equity and multiple issues
of callable non—convertible sinking fund coupon debt, based on the usual
assumption list. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology, including
numerical analysis techniques, sample data, and testing procedure. Section 4
presents an analysis of the results, and Section 5 gives a conclusion.
2. Theory
The theoretical basis of the corporate liability pricing model is
developed in Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974). They use an arbitrage
argument to show that corporate liabilities which are functions of the value
of the firm and time obey a partial differential equation which depends on4
the known schedule of interest rates rr(t) and the variance rate of firm
value a2, as well as on payouts and indentures on claims, but doesnot
depend on expected returns on assets and liabilities of the firm. Nor does
it depend on any equilibrium structure of risk and return. Readersare
referred to these papers for a derivation of the basic partial differential
equation.
A starting point for the analysis of realistic capital structures
is the standard example of contingent claims valuation as applied tonon—
convertible corporate bonds, namely the formulation in Merton (1974) ofa
callable coupon bond with no sinking fund. Merton shows that theequity
E(V,t) in a firm with one issue of such debt obeys the followingpartial
differential equation and boundary conditions






where PEP(t) is the outstanding bond principal at time t, c is thecoupon
rate per unit principal, k(t) is the call price schedule per unit principal,
* dd(V,t)is the known dividend policy and t is the maturity date of the
bond. The upper free boundary, (t), corresponds to the optimal call barrier
at or above which the firm will call the bonds. Similarly Merton shows that5
the valuation problem for the debt issue D(V,t) can be formulated as follows:





Theplan for section 2 is as follows. Section 2a generalizes the
analysis of callable nonconvertible coupon bonds to allow for sinking funds,
withand without (noncumulative) optionsto double the sinking fund payment.
Sinking funds are important because they dramatically decrease the effective
maturity of bonds, and because the option to sink at market or par makesbonds
morelike equity than otherwise. Section 2b then generalizes the analysis
to deal with multiple issues ofcallablenonconvertible sinking fund coupon
bonds. The ultimate contingent claims formulation of this valuation problem
will bear only a generic resemblance to (la)(lb).
2a. Sinking Funds
Most issues of corporate debt specify the mandatory retirement of
bonds viaperiodicsinking fund payments. Typically the firmisrequired to
retire a specified fraction of the initial bonds each period..Generally the
firmhas the option to redeem these bonds through either of two mechanisms:
(1)it canpurchase the necessary bonds inthe market and deliver them to6
the trustee, or (2) it can choose the necessary bonds by lot and retire
them by paying the standard principal amount to their owners. Often the finn
also has the option to double the number of bonds retired each period if
it wishes. Hence the firm faces the following choices each period:
(.1)Should the bonds be called?
(.2) Assuming the bonds are not called, should the mandatory
number of bonds be sunk at market or par?
(3) Assuming the bonds are not called, should the sinking
fund payment be doubled.(If this option exists.)
First the contingent claims formulation of this problem is considered
where the firm has no option to double the sinking fund payment. Next the
option to double is introduced.
2ai: Sinking funds with no option to double
Suppose that the f inn decides not to call its debt and has no option
to double. Then it must decide whether to sink bonds at market or par. Since
the only difference is in the cash payout Involved, and since higher firm
value implies higher equity value, management will choose whichever costs
less. For any given r(t), if the firm value is relatively low, then debt
will trade below par and the firm will choose to sink at market. And, for
some r(t), if firm value is relatively high, then debt will trade above par
and the firm will choose to sink at par.
Consider the stylized case of a continuous sinking fund. Let s be
the rate at which bonds are sunk, and let P(t) =P(O)—stbe the remaining
principal assuming the bonds have not been called. Then y(t)s/P(t) isthe
fractional rate at which bonds are sunk. If debt trades below par, then
total sinking fund payments are iD(V,t) where y1(t). If debt trades above
par, then total sinking fund payments are yPs.Hence a general expression7
for total sinking fund payments is ymin(D,P). Thus the contingent claims
formulation of the valuation problem for equity in the presence of a single
issue of callable nonconvertible sinking fund coupon debt, with no option
to double, is as follows:






Similarly, from (lb), the contingent claims formulation of the
valuation problem for debt in this capital structure is






In summary, the valuation problem for a capital structure with equity
and a single issue of callable nonconvertible sinking fund coupon debt, with
no option to double, divides into three regions of firm value as a function
of time. One region is defined by the fact that debt trades below par.8
This region corresponds at the maturity of the debt issue to firmvalues
where bankruptcy occurs. A "par barrier" separates thisregion from the
one above. The region above lies between the par barrier and the call
barrier, so that debt trades between par and the call price. Since the
call barrier converges to par at the maturity of the debt issue, thisregion
converges to a point. The third region lies above the call barrier. It
corresponds at the maturity of the debt issue to firm values where bankrupt-
cy does not occur.
2aii: Sinking funds with an option to double
Most sinking funds give the firm an option to double the sinking
fund payments. This section deals with noncumulative options todouble,
where the right to double is unaffected by past doubling decisions.
There also exist cumulative options to double, where the right to
double is affected by past decisions. Given the option to double thesinking
fund payment, the actual principal that will be outstanding atany future date
is unknown. Hence the values of equity and debt as can no longer be written
as functions of firm value and time alone. However the following theorem
says that these values can be written as functions of firm value, current
principal, and time:
Theorem I:
Assume that the optimal retirement rate, P(V,P,t), for bonds can be expressed
as a deterministic function of firm value, current principal, and time.
Then equity and debt and functions E(V,P,t) and D(V,P,t) that obey the
following partial differential equations:9
(3a) 0 =1/22V2E+trV_ymin(D,P)_cP_d]EV_y*pEp+Et_ rE + d




Apply Ito's lemma to E(V,P,t) and D(V,P,t), noting that P is locally certain.
Substitute this into the standard arbitrage proof given in Merton (1974) or
Merton (1977). Q.E.D.
Theorem I provides a valuation logic once the optimal policy with
respect to doubling the sinking fund payment has been determined. Consider
the decision whether to double the current sinking fund payment, assuming
that management acts optimally thereafter. Suppose that the sinking fund
payment is not doubled, so that the fraction of bonds retired is ydt =sdt/P.
Let V and P be firm value and current principal before the sinking fundpay-
ment. Hence the value of equity after the sinking fund payment is
E[V—min(D,P)ydt,(i—ydt)P,tl.. Suppose alternatively that the sinking fund
payment is doubled. By analogy the value of equity after the sinking fund
payment is E[V—2min(D,P)ydt,(1—2'ydt)P,t}. The difference between the two equity
values is thus [min(D,P)E+ PE]Ydt. If the bracketed expression is positive,
the firm should not double the sinking fund payment; otherwise it should.
Since min(D,P) is less than the call price kP, doubling the sinking
fund payment is a cheap way of calling a fraction of the bonds. Hence there
will be a "doubling barrier" (P,t) which lies below the call barrier V(P,t).
The firm will double the sinking fund payment above the doubling barrier,
but not below it. The firm is indifferent between doubling and not doubling
right at the barrier; hence the expression we just derived vanishes at the
barrier. Using this logic in (3a), the contingent claims formulation of
the valuation problem for equity in the presence of a single issue of callable
nonconvertible sinking fund coupon debt, with a noncumulative option to double,10
is as follows:
(4a) 0 =l/2ZV2E+[rV_ymin(P,P)_cP_d1E_iPE+ E_ rE +d,0<V<(P,t)





min[D(V,P,t),P]E(VP,t) ÷ PE(VPt) =0
E(V,P,t) V —kP
E(V,P,t) =1
Silimarly, from (3b), the contingent claims formulation of the valuation
problem for debt in this capital structure is
(4b) 0 =1/2a2V2D+[rV_ymin(D,P)_cP_d1D— yPD+ Dt_ rD + ymin(D,P) +cP
for 0<V<V(P,t)









Actual sinking fund indentures cause claims to be nonhomogeneous
functions of firm value and current principal. The reason is that the
fractional rate at which bonds are retired (y or 2y where y =sIP)
grows as current principal declines. However, there is a reasonable
approximation to actual sinking fund indentures that simplifies the analysis
and leads to additional insights. Namely assume that the fractional rate
at which bonds must be sunk is y, a constant, or 2y if the sinking fund
payment is doubled. In effect this assumes that the current decision whether
to double the sinking fund payment does not affect permitted future fractional
rates at which bonds are sunk.
This assumption plus the assumption that dividends are proportional
to firm value reduce the dimensionality of the equations in (4a) (4b).
Consider standardized values for firm value (xV/P), equity (fEE/P), and
debt (gD/P); and define the proportional dividend rate as ad/V. Substitut-
ing these into (4a) and using the new assumptions, the following standardized
formulation
0 =l/2a2x2f+ [(r+y—5)x—ymln(g,l)—c]f + (r+'y)f+ 6x, O<x<(t)
(5a)
0 =l/2c2x2f+[(r+2y—cS)x—2y—c]f+ (r+2y)f + cSx, (t)<<x(t)
f(O,t) =0
* f(x,t) =max(O,x—l)
(l—)f(,t) + f(x,t) =012
f(x,t) =x—k
=1
Note that this implies a doubling barrier which lies between the
par barrier and the call barrier, so that the firm is always sinking at par
if it doubles the sinking fund payment. To see that this is so, reconsider
the expression derived before, namely min(D,P)E ÷PEE.Suppose that the
debt is trading below par, so that this expression is DEv + PE =(VE)E.q+PEE.
Under the new assumptions, equity is a homogeneous function of firm value
and current principal. Hence by Euler's condition E =
VEv+
PEE.Substi—
tuting this into the expression gives E(l_Ev) 0, which says that the sinking
fund payment should not be doubled.
Similarly, using (4b), debt is proportional to a standardized solution,
g(x,t), where





(l—)g(,t) + g(,t) —1=0
g(x,t) =k
=013
In summary, the valuation problem for a capital structure with equity
and a single issue of callable nonconvertible sinking fund coupon debt, with
a noncumulative option to double, divides into four regions of firm value as
a function of time. One region is defined by the fact that debt trades
below par. In this region bonds are sunk at market and sinking fund payments
are not doubled. This region corresponds at the maturity of the debt issue
to firm values where bankruptcy occurs. A second region lies between the
par barrier and the doubling barrier. In this region bonds are sunk at par
and sinking fund payments are not doubled. A third region lies between the
doubling barrier and the call barrier. In this region bonds are sunk at
par and sinking fund payments are doubed. Since the call barrier converges
to par at the maturity of the debt issue, both the second and third regions
converge to a point. The fourth region lies above the call barrier. It
corresponds at the maturity of the debt Issue to firm values where bankruptcy
does not occur. For some given r(t), k(t) and c, it is possible that debt
will always trade below par. Thus bonds are always sunk at market and the
sinking fund payment is never doubled. In these cases there is only one
region, since the par barrier, doubling barrier and the call barrier do not
exist.
Unfortunately, incorporating the option to double the sinking fund
payment in a capital structure with numerous debt issues dramatically increases
the dimensionality of the valuation problem. Therefore the option to double
is ignored in the numerical approximations. The results in this section
Imply that this leads to underpricing of equity and the overpricing of debt.
2b. Multiple debt issues
This section generalizes the analysis to allow for multiple debt issues.
This feature of debt is important because it introduces interactions among14
bonds that are not present in the standard example of one debt issue.
For expositional simplicity, this section considers the case of two issues
of callable nonconvertible sinking fund coupon debt (with no options to
double).
The value of any remaining claims in a capital structure initially
composed of equity and two issues of callable nonconvertible sinking fund
coupon debt, with no options to double, will depend on whether either
debt issue has been redeemed via a call decision, as well as on firm value
and time. In effect the capital structure of the firm can be in any one of
four states, which is indexeed by the variable e. If there are n debt issues
then there are 2' such states. 0 =0is the state where both issues of debt
have been previously called. The valuation problem in this state is trivial;
equity value equal firm value. 0 =1is the state where bond 1 is alive but
bond 2 has been called. 8 =2is the state where bond 2 is alive but bond 1
has been called. Finally 8 =3is the state where neither bond has been called.
With this notation the values of claims can be written as functions
of the current capital structure state as well as firm value and time. Letting
E(V,e,t), D(Y)0,t), and D'(V,0,t) be the values of equity and the two debt
issues, they obey the following system of partial differential equations in
any relevant capital structure state:
(6a) 0 =l/2a2V2E+(rV_r__d)E+ E_ rE + d ; 0 =1,2,3
(6b) 0 =1/2a2V2D+(rV_7r_1r_d)D+ Dt_ rD + ; 0 =1,3
(6c) 0 =1/2c2V2D+(rV—rr—Ad)D+ D— rD+ ir ; 0 =2,3
7Tandiraresimply total cash payouts to the two debt issues. Taking account
of whether bonds have been called and whether it makes sense to sink at market15
or par,
ir(V,1,t) =7r(V,3,t)ymin(D,P) + cP
ir(V,2,t)0
rr(V,2,t) =r(V,3,t)ymin(D,P) + cP
ir(V,l,t) =0
Note how current values of debt issues enter into valuation equations for
other claims. Hence equations (6a)(6b)(6c) must generally be solved simul-
taneously. It is always possible to eliminate one relevant equation, since
the claims sum to firmvalue.
Boundary conditions are needed to relate the solutions to (6a)(6b)
(6c) for different capital structure states to each other and to complete
the contingent claims formulation of the general valuation problem. For
each relevant security in each state a lower boundary condition, a terminal
boundary condition, and an upper (free) boundary condition must be specified.
The lower boundary condition in every case is trivial; limited liability
translates zero firm value into zero value for every claim: E(0,e,t) =
D(o,e,t)=D(0,O,t)=0.
Each state has a unique terminal boundary. Let t be the maturity of
debt Issue D and let tbe the maturity of debt issue D. Without loss of
* *_
generalityt <t .Firstsuppose that the firm is in capital structure
state 0 =1,where the second debt issue has been called. Then the terminal
boundary coincides with the maturity of the first debt issue. The terminal
boundary condition in this case is standard for a capital strucutre with a





Nextsuppose that the firm is in capital structure state 0 =2,where the
first debt issue has been called. Then the terminal boundary coincides with





Finally suppose that the firm is in capital structure state 0 =3,
where neither debt issue has been called. Then t1e terminal boundary coincides
with the earlier maturity date, since the firm must transit to a new capital
structure state on this date. In the example the first debt issue matures
*att .Sincethe debt is callable, the only relevant region has to do with
firmvalues which are insufficient to cover the remaining principal on the
first debt issue, so that the firm is bankrupt. Since firm value is insuffi-
cient to meet principal payments on the first debt issue alone, equity is
worthless in this region:
*
E(V,3,t)= 0
The value of the two debt issues in this region depends on seniority. If








Finally,if neither issue is senior, then both get pro rata shares:
* * * *
D(V,3,t)= VP(t)/[P(t )+P(t )]
D(V,3,t)=VP_(t*)/[P(t*)+ p(t*)]
It remains to specify upper free boundary conditions corresponding
to optimal call decisions in each of the capital structure states. First
suppose that the firm is in capital structure state 0 =1,where the second
debt issue has been called. The upper free boundary conditions in this




Next suppose that the firm is in capital structure state 0 =2,where both
debt issues are alive. The upper free boundary in this state corresponds
to the barrier where the firm calls one of the bond issues and thus transit
to another state. Since management chooses the bond to call so as to maximize
shareholder wealth,
E[V(3,t),3,t] =max{E[(3,t)—k(t)P(t),2,t],E[V(3,t)—k(t)P(t),l.tJ}18
Similarly the "high contact" optimization condition is
Ev[v(3,t),3,t] =maxE[V(3,t)—k(t)P(t),2,t],E[(3,t)—k(t)p'(t),1,tJ /3V
Suppose that it is optimal to call the first debt issue at V(3,t), then the
values of the debt issues on this barrier are
D[V(3,t),3,t] =k(t)P(t)
D'[V(3,t).3,t] =D[V(3,t)—k(t)P(t),2,t]
Conversely suppose that it is optimal to call the second debt issue, then
D[V(3,t),3,t] =D[V(3,t)k(t)P(t),l,t]
D[V(3,t),3,t] =k(t)P(t)
In summary, the valuation problem for capital structures containing
equity and two issues of callable nonconvertible sinking fund coupon debt
corresponds to the simultaneous solution of a system of partial differential
equations. Appropriate combinatorial application of these principles leads
directly to a formulation of the valuation problem for capital structures
containing equity and n issues of callable nonconvertible sinking fund coupon
debt. This approach is necessitated by the fundamental problem of determining
the optimal call policy governing the n callable bonds. This formulation
identifies that policy which maximizes the value of the equity.
It is important to understand the dimensionality of the n issue case.
First note that there are possible capital structure states, including
the trivial state of an all—equity firm. Furthermore there are a number of19
securities to be valued in each state. One way to calculate the number of
different solutions to partial differential equations required in the n issue
case is as follows. There are ()= 1capital structure states corresponding
to 0 bonds having been called. In this one state there are n+l securities
outstanding for a total of n+l solutions. There are (—-j-) =ncapital
structure states corresponding to 1 bond having been called. In each of
these n states there are n securities outstanding. Continuing in this way,
n-l
we find that there are E (—.---)(n+l—j)solutions in all. Hence one high
j=O
priority line of research in terms of applying contingent claims valuation
to realistic capital structures is the derivation of rational theorems which
rule out various capital structure states —e.g.,which show that certain
kinds of bonds are always called first.
3. Data and methodology
Data were collected for 15 firms on a monthly basis from January 1975
to January 1982. The firms were chosen based on a number of criteria at the
beginning of 1975:
1. Simple Capital Structures (i.e. one class of stock, no convertible
bonds, small number of debt issues, no preferred stock).
2. Small proportion of private debt to total capital.
3. Small proportion of short termnotespayable or capitalized
leases to total capital.
4. Allpubliclytraded debt is rated.
















Thecontingent claims valuation model requires three kinds of data
in order to solve for prices of individual claims as functions of totalfirm
value:(1)indenture data, (2)variance rate data, and (3) interest rate
data.The bond indentures define the boundary conditions which constitute
the economic description of various claims. For example, the followingdata
were collected for each bond for each firm: principal, coupon rate,call
price schedule, call protection period, sinking fund payments,and options
tosink at market or par. The bond covenant data were collected from Moody's
Bond Guide, except that sinking fund payments were collected from the monthly
S&PBond Guide. For purposes of testing the model, actual bond prices were
also collected from the latter sources.
The following procedure was used to estimate a variance ratefor each
firm in the sample, as of each January from 1977 through 1982. First a
variance rate for all publicly traded claims was estimated. Namely,for each
ofthe trailing 24 months, the logarithmIc total return wascalculated on the
totalof all publicly traded claims, including any cash payouts, that were
outstanding at the beginning of the month. The samplevariance of this return
gave an estimate of the variance ratenf all traded claims. An estimate of
the variance and value of nontraded debt was also needed.It was assumed that
the variance rate of nontraded debt is equal to the variance rateof all traded21
debt, which was estimated in the same way as the variance rate of all traded
claims. It was also assumed that market value for nontraded debt is equal
to book value. Lastly, assuming that the returns to the nontraded debt were
uncorrelated with the returns to the traded claims, the variance rate for the
whole firm was estimated as a "market value" weighted sum of the variance
rate of the traded claims and the variance rate of the nontraded debt. To
the extent that the returns of the nontraded debt are positively correlated
with the returns to the traded claims, this estimation procedure will
systematically underestimate the variance rate of the firm. Table 1 summarizes
the estimates.
The standard assumption in contingent claims analysis is that the
future course of interest rates, r(t), is known. Specifically, it is often
assumed that the instantaneous rate of interest is constant through time,
I.e. a flat term structure. The assumption of a flat term structure results
in a fundamental problem for the empirical test of the contingent claims
model. If a flat term structure is assumed then the model will misprice
riskiess bonds. Therefore the test of whether contingent claims analysis
can price risky bonds is systematically flawed. This problem is handled by
by the assumption that the future course of the one year rate of interest
will be consistent with the one year forward interest rates implied by the
current term structure. This procedure will result in the correct pricing
of riskiess bonds. The following procedure was used to estimate implied
one year forward interest rates for 25 years, as of each January from 1977
through 1982. First identify all par government bonds as of that date.
These data were gathered from the Wall Street Journal. There are usually
much less than 25 such bonds. Therefore linear interpolation was used to



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































curve was solved for implied one year forward rates. Hence the implied forward
rates pertain to a par term structure.
The method of Markov chains is used to approximate solutions to the
problems posed in the previous section. Parkinson (1977), Mason (1979) and
Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979) use Markov chains to approximate solutions
to valuation problems similar to the ones considered in this paper. The
method of finite differences has been used by Brennan and Schwartz (1976a,
l976b) to treat similar contingent claims equations. The methods of Markov
chains and finite differences are very similar, as demonstrated in Brennan
and Schwartz (1978) and Mason (1978). Readers are referred to thesepapers
for background on numerical analysis techniques.
If all claims are publicly traded, then the value of the firm can be
observed and prices for all claims, relative to the observed firm value, can
be predicted. However, since all claims on the test firms are not publicly
traded, an alternative approach had to be taken. Namely, the equity pricing
function was used to estimate firm value. In other words, what firm value
is consistent with the actual equity value? Then this estimated firm value
was used to predict debt prices. Note that this procedure amplifies systematic
errors in pricing the debt. For example, suppose that the model systematically
underprices equity and overprices debt, as functions of firm value. Then
this procedure will make two, compounding errors. First, it will overestimate
the value of the firm. Then it will overestimate debt as a function of firm
value. Hence it will overestimate debt for both reasons. Counting eachyear
from 1977 through 1982, and counting each bond existing in each year for each
of the 15 firms, we solved numerically for prices of 177 bonds, as well as
for equity values. The next section describes our results.23
4. Pinpirical Results
Table 2 summarizes the empirical results for the 177 bonds in the
sample. It reveals that the average percentage pricing error —definedas
predicted price minus actual price, divided by actual price —isless than
1%. The standard deviation of the percentage pricing error is less than 8%.
The average absolute value of the percentage pricing error is about 6%. The
accompanying histogram in Figure 1 gives additional information on these errors.
Table 2
Total Number of Bonds 177











High Rated Low Rated
Total Number of Bonds 151 Total Number of Bonds 26
Fraction of Sample 85.31% Fraction of Sample 14.69%
Percentage Error Percentage Error
Mean —0.0006 Mean 0.0468
Std Dev 0.0774 Std Dev 0.0733
Absolute Percentage Error Absolute Percentage Error
Mean 0.0580 Mean 0.0752
Std Dev 0.0513 Std Dev 0.0436
Difference of Means Test —2.89
Although there is almost no systematic bias in pricing errors for
the sample as a whole, there might be systematic bias among subsets of bonds
that simply cancel out in the entire sample. This was tested for by dividing
the sample according to conventional classifications. For example, Table 3
indicates that the model underprices bonds with high ratings (>A rating) and
overprices bonds with low ratings (<A rating) and that this difference is
statistically significant.
Statistical significance is measured by a difference of means test.
This test assumes that the two underlying populations are normally distributed
with the same variance. In addition it is assumed that the samples are made
up of independent draws. To the extent that the samples are not made up of
independent draws, the test is biased in favor of rejecting the null hypothesis.
It is likely that the samples studied in this section are not perfectly inde-
pendent thus the reports of statistical significance are biased upward.
Table 4 shows that the model underprices bonds on firms
with low variance rates (ci<.2) and overprices bonds on firms with high
variance rates (a>.2).25
Table 4
Low Variance High Variance
Total Number of Bonds 95 Total Number of Bonds 82
Fraction of Sample 53.67% Fraction of Sample 46.33%
Percentage Error Percentage Error
Mean —0.0067 Mean 0.0215
Std Dev 0.0802 Std Dev 0.0740
Absolute Percentage Error Absolute Percentage Error
Mean 0.0589 Mean 0.0624
Std Dev 0.0548 Std Dev 0.0452
Difference of Means Test —2.40
Table 5 indicates that the model underprices bonds with stated maturities
less than 15 years and overprices bonds with stated maturities greater than
15 years. Of course, total variance equals the variance rate multiplied by
time. Hence overpricing high variance and long maturity bondsmay be two
sides of the same coin.
Table 5
Long Term Short Term
Total Number of Bonds 84 Total Number of Bonds 93
Fraction of Sample 47.46% Fraction of Sample 52.54%
Percentage Error Percentage Error
Mean 0.0243 Mean —0.0098
Std Dev 0.0657 Std Dev 0.0855
Absolute Percentage Error Absolute Percentage Error
Mean 0.0576 Mean 0.0632
Std Dev 0.0399 Std Dev 0.0585
Difference of Means Test 2.9426
Table 6
Senior Bonds Junior Bonds
Total Number f Bonds 163 Total Number of Bonds 14
Fraction of Sample 92.09% Fraction of Sample 7.91%
Percentage Error Percentage Error
Mean 0.0020 Mean 0.0578
Std Dev 0.0020 Std Dev 0.0435
Absolute Percentage Error Absolute Percentage Error
Mean 0.0608 Mean 0.0578
Std Dev 0.0512 Std Dev 0.0435
Difference of Means Test —2.58
Table 6 shows that the model prices senior bonds correctly on average, but
overprices junior bonds.
Table 7
Low Coupon High Coupon
Total Number of Bonds 73 Total Number of Bonds 104
Fraction of Sample 41.24% Fraction of Sample 58.76%
Percentage Error Percentage Error
Mean —0.0354 Mean 0.0358
Std Dev 0.0855 Std Dev 0.0575
Absolute Percentage Error Absolute Percentage Error
Mean 0.0693 Mean 0.0544
Std Dev 0.0613 Std Dev 0.0404
Difference of Means Test —6.59
Finally, Table 7 shows that the model underprices low coupon bonds (coupon
rate <7%)and overprices high coupon bonds (coupon rate >7%).27
Insummary, the model tends to underprice safe bonds and overprice
risky bonds in a systematic way. This leads us to conclude that the usual
assumptions in the contingent claims valuation literature are violated in
some systematic way. Three assumptions are questioned in particular:
(1) the assumption of zero personal taxes, (2) the assumption ofa constant
variance rate, and (3) the assumption of perfect antidilution protection.
The plan is as follows. First there is a discussion of what kinds ofpricing
errors would ensue from violation of each of these three assumptions. Then
empirical evidence is presented from the sample that is designed to discrimi-
nate among pricing errors induced by violation of each of these assumptions.
4a. Personal tax assumption
According to Assumption (A.l), which is standard in the contingent
claims valuation literature, there are no personal taxes. This implies that
investors capitalize ordinary income and capital gains in the sameway.
However, conventional wisdom says that investors prefer capital gains to
ordinary income for tax reasons. Furthermore, Ingersoll (1976) finds that
inclusion of differential taxes on ordinary income and capital gains improves
the ability of the contingent claims valuation model to predict prices for
the income and capital shares of dual funds.
If differential taxes cause investors to capitalize ordinary income
differently from capital gains, then failure to include this in the model could
lead to overpricing bonds with higher current yields relative to bonds with
lower current yields. (See Ingersoll (1976, p. 110) for a careful discussion
of this issue.) First consider highly rated bonds. Recall that theinterest
rates in the model are derived from a term structure forpar government bonds.28
Given the tax treatment of bonds trading in the secondary market, high
quality discount bonds should be underpriced relative to high quality premium
bonds. This is due to the fact that the IRS allows investors to amortize
secondary market premiums against interest income while also allowing
realized gains due to secondary market discounts to be taxed at capital
gains rates.
Another dimension of any tax effect has to do with risk. Consider
low quality par bonds versus high quality par bonds —e.g.,new issue bonds
on high variance versus low variance firms. The expected capital loss on
the low quality bonds is larger in absolute terms than the expected capital
loss on the high quality bonds. Hence the low quality bonds will have a
higher coupon rate than the high quality bonds. Since the higher taxes on
the low quality bond are ignored, any tax effect will cause low quality to
be overpriced relative to high quality bonds. In particular, since government
par bonds are perfectly safe, any tax effect will cause corporate par bonds
to be overpriced in general. Similar considerations say that any tax effect
will cause junior par bonds to be overpriced relative to senior par bonds.
And similar considerations also suggest that any tax effect will cause longer
maturity par bonds to be overpriced relative to shorter maturity par bonds.
4b. Variance rate assumption
According to Assumption (A.4), which is standard in the contingent
claims valuation literature, the variance rate of firm value 02 is a constant.
Empirical evidence for cotmnon equity suggest that its variance rate goes up
as its level goes down. Of course this s consistent with a constant variance
rate for firm value —becauseof the possibility of leverage effects. However,
it is also consistent with a nonconstant firm value variance rate.29
Suppose that the variance rate of firm value is not a constant, but
rather increases as firm value decreases. For example, the stochastic pro-
cess for firm value might belong to the constant elasticity of variance class.
And suppose that a constant variance rate is falsely assumed in estimating c2.
What kinds of pricing errors would this include? These errors would be simi-
lar in type to those induced by an underestimate of a variance rate that is
in fact constant. In other words, in either case the probability of financial
distress is significantly underestimated.
Underestimating the variance will not matter much for high quality
bonds. But it will cause low quality bonds to be overpriced by a significant
amount. Hence underestimating the variance will cause corporate bonds to be
overpriced in general and will cause low quality bonds to be overpriced
relative to high quality bonds. Similar considerations suggest that the
underestimating the variance will cause junior bonds to be overpriced relative
to senior bonds, and longer maturity bonds to be overpriced relative to shorter
maturity bonds.
4c. Dilution assumption
According to the perfect antidilution assumption in (A.8), which is
standard in the contingent claims valuation literature, no new bonds can be
issued until all old bonds have been extinguished. Furthermore, according
to the perfect liquidity assumption in (A.9), firms can simply sell assets
In order to make cash payouts. Hence in the model equity maximizes its value
by funding all cash payouts through asset sales.
However, firms which call bonds normally have the option to fund the
call by issuing new bonds with the same priority. Holding firm value constant,
this allows management to dilute any remaining bonds, as compared to the model30
which allows for no dilution. On the other hand, the model causes firm
value to go down when bonds are called, as compared to refunding with new
bonds that keeps firm value constant. Now suppose equity can choose between
refunding and asset liquidation to finance a call decision. The option to
refund can have value to equity. Failure to include the option to refund
in our model will cause equity to be underpriced and debt to be overpriced
in general. Since the option to refund has value because of the possibility
of diluting existing debt, junior debt will be overpriced relative to senior
debt and longer maturity debt will overpriced relative to shorter maturity
debt. In other words, debt can be economically junior either because it is
explicitly junior or because it has a relatively longer maturity than other
debt.
4d. Empirical evidence on violation of these assumptions
The empirical evidence tends to confirm the existence of a tax effect,
a variance effect, and a dilution effect. Table 8 gives evidence of a tax
effect. It shows that the model underprices discount bonds relative to
premium bonds. These results continue to obtain when examirig only high
quality bonds, where variance rate effects and dilution effects are minimal.
Table 8
Premium Bonds Discount Bonds
Total Number of Bonds 21 Total Number of Bonds 156
Fraction of Sample 11.86% Fraction of Sample 88.14%
Percentage Error Percentage Error
Mean 0.0487 Mean 0.0007
Std Dev 0.0579 Std Dev 0.0516
Absolute Percentage Error Absolute Percentage Error
Mean 0.0627 Mean 0.0602
Std Dev 0.0424 Std Dev 0.0516
Difference of Means Test 2.6731
Table 9 gives further evidence of a tax effect. It shows that the model
overprices bonds with above—average coupon yields relative to bonds with
below—average coupon yields.(The median coupon yield in the sample is
approximately 9%). Again, the results continue to obtain when examining only
high quality bonds. Hence there is unambiguous evidence for the existence
of a tax effect.
Table 9
High Coupon/Pric Ratio (> .09) Low Coupon/Price Ratio (<=.09)
Total Number of Bonds Total Number of Bonds 90
Fraction of Sample 49.15% Fraction of Sample 50.85%
Percentage Error Percentage Error
Mean 0.0298 Mean —0.0162
Std Dev 0.0658 Std Dev 0.0833
Absolute Percentage Error Absolute Percentage Error
Mean 0.0586 Mean 0.0624
Std Dev 0.0423 Std Dev 0.0574
Difference of Means Test 4.05
There is also empirical evidence for a variance effect. A naive test
for the existence of a variance effect is whether bonds of firms with high
estimated variance rates are overpriced relative to bonds of firms with low
estimated variance rat, since rIsky bond are more sensitive to underestimating
variance than safe bonds. Table 4 showed that this is the case. However,
this is a naive test, because a tax effect alone would cause risky bonds to
be overpriced relative to safe bonds. This is because, everything else equal,
risky bonds have higher expected capital losses than safe bonds, which is
compensated for by higher current yield. To test for a variance effect32
independent of any tax effect, the sample is first split according to high
versus low current yield. This is done to control for the tax effect. Then
pricing errors are compared for bonds of high versus low variance firms with-
in each subsample. Table 10 reports these results. It shows that bonds of
high variance firms continue to be overpriced relative to low variance firms
within each subsample, although the effect is more pronounced for high
current yield bonds. Furthermore, almost identical results hold when junior
bonds are excluded from the sample, to check against the possibility that
variance only proxies for a dilution effect. These results are interpreted
as evidence for a variance effect in addition to a tax effect.
Table 10
Low Coupon/Price High Variance








High Coupon/Price Low Variance








Low Coupon/Price Low Variance








High Coupon/Price High Variance
Total Number of Bonds 45

























Lastly, the question remains as to evidence for a dilution effect,
in addition to a tax effect and a variance effect. A naivetest for the
existence of a dilution effect is whether economically junior bondsare
overpriced —thatis, either bonds which are explicitly junior or bonds that
are effectively junior because of their longer maturity —relativeto econo-
mically senior bonds. Tables 5 and 6 showed that this is thecase; junior
bonds are overpriced relative to senior bonds and longermaturity bonds are
overpriced relative to shorter maturity bonds. (The median maturity in the
sample is around 15 years).
As before, this is a naive test, because either a tax effect ora
variance effect alone would cause junior bonds to be overpriced relative to
senior bonds and longer maturity relative to shorter maturity bonds. To
get a more sophisticated test, the sample is first restricted to bonds with
high current coupon yield issued by corporations with high variance rates,
which tends to control for tax and variance effects. Table 11 and 12 show
the results. Although economically junior bonds continue to be overpriced
relative to economically senior bonds, the effect is not strong. Hence there
appears to be a dilution effect, but it is not as strong as the tax and
variance effects.Junior/High Yield, Variance
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Short Bonds/High Yield, Variance
Total Number of Bonds 17



















Mean 0.0540 Mean 0.0407
Std Dev 0.0604 Std Dev 0.0686
AbsolutePercentageError AbsolutePercentageError
Mean 0.0681 Mean 0.0656
Std Dev 0.0440 Std Dev 0.045535
5. Conclusion
In this paper a theoretical model is derived for valuing claims in
realistic capital structures containing equity and multiple issues of callable
nonconvertible sinking fund coupon debt, based on the usual assumptions in
the contingent claims valuation literature. This model is testedon a number
of bonds for 15 firms yearly from 1977 through 1982. Thepredicted prices
are not systematically different from actual prices for the sample as a whole.
However, predicted prices are systematically different from actual prices for
various types of bonds in the sample. Evidence exists for a systematic tax
effect and a systematic variance effect in the results. There is also evidence
for a less significant dilution effect associated with the option to refund.
Establishing the empirical validity of contingent claims analysis
as a corporate liability pricing model is a large and complex task. A number
of theoretical and methodological problems must be addressed. For example,
as demonstrated in this paper, sinking funds and optimal call policies for
multiple bond capital structures warrant further theoretical study.It has
also been demonstrated the detailed consideration of the interaction of
multiple bond covenants can significantly increase the dimensionality of the
overall valuation problem. This underscores the need for research into more
efficient numerical analysis methods.
We view this paper as an important first step in establishing the
empirical validity of contingent clains analysis. Given the results of the
paper, current research is underway, using an expanded data base, where the
problem formulation takes explicit account of personal taxes, the option
to refund, the cost of financial distress and changing variance rates. Once
the results of this current research are known, a portfolio test will be con-
ducted to determine if market inefficiencies can explain any of the discrepan-
cies between the model prices and market prices.References
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